The concessionaire accepts the GMI mechanism (or not) when it submits its “economic offer”; subsequently, for each year where the GMI is valid, the concessionaire may decide to make use of the funds. Concessionaire must present its GMI offer for years 1 to 13 of the operation phase (which can be equal to or lower than the maximum amounts offered by the government in the bidding documents as shown in table 3.5 of the concession agreement). If concessionaire chooses to take the minimum income for a specific year, it must pay a guarantee (according to a formula in the contract).

The agreement is for the duration of 25 years (renewable for another 25 years for public interest reasons). All risks are assumed by the private sector; in consequence, the full revenues go to the private sector - ie, toll revenues, commercial revenues and revenues from services rendered to third parties. The agreement provides for an optional “Guaranteed Minimum Income” (GMI) mechanism for the first 10 years of operation (clause 8.11) following the same guidelines as the contract above. The State of Costa Rica provides the land for the works (clause 1.5).

The objective of this report is to analyze the principal clauses of bus concession contracts to allow them to be adapted to other cities, and their concrete impact on the behavior of bus operators, the quality of the service provided, and transit systems finances, based mainly on the experience of Transantiago in Santiago, Chile, and in London, England . The ultimate aim is to derive lessons learned and provide recommendations for other cities that plan to embark on a contracting exercise or are faced with contract renegotiations with bus operators. 

Private sector initiatives for road development are not a new phenomenon: they have existed for centuries in parts of Europe, such as the United Kingdom and France, particularly in developing bridges over waterways. From the 1970s onwards, governments have increasingly contracted out some of the functions of construction, operation, financing and maintenance of the road networks to the private sector. Whilst toll concessions are one form of PPP, tolls should not be considered synonymous with PPP, as there are many instances of publicly financed roads carrying tolls.

One of a series of five reports commissioned by the Asian Development Bank (ADB) to identify and recommend best practices and specific steps to be taken, by ADB’s developing member countries to encourage both private sector investment and competition in infrastructure development. This report focuses specifically on the road sector. 

Tracking Reference:

Global_ADB Toolkit Best Practices for Promoting Private Sector Investment in Infrastructure (Roads)_EN.pdf

By Matt Bull and Anita Mauchan, Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility (PPIAF), October 2014.

This Standard Request for Proposals for Build-Transfer-Operate (BTO) Public-Private Partnership (PPP) Projects was developed and published by the Public and Private Infrastructure Investment Management Center (PIMAC) in March 2010. PIMAC also provides a Draft Standard Concession Agreement for Road BTO Projects on its website. 

Related information: 

Draft Standard Concession Agreement for Road BTO Projects

Value for Money Report: Completion of Autoroute 30

Quebec, Canada

Sample terms of reference for preparing a refined feasibility study for a proposed city by-pass. The terms of reference document is predicated on the fact that most of the required information for a solid feasibility study has already been prepared. Most of the additional effort required to prepare a refined feasibility study is directed at presenting the facts and analysis within an improved report structure to present the case for the proposed by-pass.

Review of Recent Toll Road Experience in Selected Countries and Preliminary Tool Kit for Toll Road Development

Asian Toll Road Development Program Draft Final Report

Prepared by the World Bank and Ministry of Construction, Japan