Incentive Structure in Transit Concession Contracts: The Case of Santiago, Chile, and London, England
By Andrés Gómez-Lobo E. (Department of Economics, University of Chile) and Julio Briones (Department of Transport Engineering and Logistics, Catholic University of Chile), Clean Air Institute, January 2013.
The objective of this report is to analyze the principal clauses of bus concession contracts to allow them to be adapted to other cities, and their concrete impact on the behavior of bus operators, the quality of the service provided, and transit systems finances, based mainly on the experience of Transantiago in Santiago, Chile, and in London, England . The ultimate aim is to derive lessons learned and provide recommendations for other cities that plan to embark on a contracting exercise or are faced with contract renegotiations with bus operators.
Related Information:
Tracking Reference:
Global_Incentive Structure in Transit Concession Contracts The Case of Santiago, Chile, and London, England_EN.pdf
Find more @ Public-Private Partnerships for Transport
Image by Pixabay
