Output-Based Aid at Work in Public-Private Partnerships
The following text is adapted from the GPOBA brochure “Output-Based Aid at Work in Public-Private-Partnerships”, found here: https://www.gpoba.org/sites/gpoba/files/OBA51_PPP.pdf
The following text is adapted from the GPOBA brochure “Output-Based Aid at Work in Public-Private-Partnerships”, found here: https://www.gpoba.org/sites/gpoba/files/OBA51_PPP.pdf
Blantyre Water Board (BWB) is a parastatal organization in charge of the water supply service in the city of Blantyre, Malawi. The organization has established several payment modes that vary from payments directly done to the BWB offices, banks, supermarkets, or pharmacies, to Mobile Payments, case in which BWB customers with specific mobile carriers “need to register for the service and load money in their phones which will enable them to pay for their bills.”
Related Information:
“The Electric Social Compensation Fund (FOSE) promotes profitable RE private investment in off-grid power in rural towns, through subsidies, as part of a social inclusion policy.
The FOSE (legislated through Law No. 27510 of 2001) intends to promote electricity access to all residential customers whose consumption is lower than 100 kWh per month and to promote private investment in rural electrification systems under 20 MW.
Zambia: The Devolution Trust Fund (DTF) is a basket financing instrument with the aim to assist the commercial water supply and sewerage utilities (CUs) to extend their services to the urban poor. The DTF mainly promotes the extension of public water distribution systems and onsite sanitation in low-income areas. Its intervention has benefited Zambia’s poor - more than one million people.
Related Information:
This note illustrates how modelling techniques can be used to inform the design of direct subsidy schemes, ensuring that they are both cost-effective and accurate in reaching the target population.
Related Information:
The paper explains the experience of the water sector reform in Panamá which grants a direct subsidy to the poor instead of to the utilities.
Related Information:
Utilities often fail to recover through tariffs the costs of operation and maintenance, let alone investment in infrastructure. There is a common perception that tariff increases are politically untenable and so utilities become subsidized out of general taxation, whether there is a deliberate policy to this end or, as is often the case because the service provider cannot balance its books at the end of the fiscal period.
This document studies a program in Manila which was implemented to obtain universal water coverage during its first ten years. The program was impactful in low-income neighborhoods due to the structure of concessions. The study details the background of the project, the contractual arrangements, and incentives and concludes with the lessons learned from this case.
This sample agreement of a water and lease includes the possibility of including in the contract alternative water provision means such as standpipes and water kiosks; and indicates that whenever possible, the Operator shall subcontract local standpipe and kiosk management to standpipe agents and to communities. (Provision 23).
Tracking Reference:
This document explains the lessons learned from contractual arrangements with third parties for service provision, and ways to deliver improved management service in the water sector mainly in low income countries. It provides examples and different ways that would enable a practitioner to understand local needs and carve existing and new solutions accordingly.
The document mentions some examples of protecting the interests of the poor, such as: