Risk Distribution and Balance Sheet Treatment - Practical Guide
Risk Distribution and Balance Sheet Treatment - Practical Guide, European PPP Expertise Centre (EPEC) October 2011
Risk Distribution and Balance Sheet Treatment - Practical Guide, European PPP Expertise Centre (EPEC) October 2011
By Tomoko Matsukawa and Odo Habeck, Trends and Policy Options No. 4, Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility (PPIAF) and The World Bank 2007.
The objective of this study is to provide a concise yet comprehensive guide as well as reference information for practitioners of infrastructure financing, including private sector financiers and developing country officials. The work is also intended as a reference for institutions offering (or developing) risk mitigation instruments, allowing them to learn from each other’s recent practices.
Public-Private Partnerships in the New EU Member States - Managing Fiscal Risk, Nina Budina
Hana Polackova Brixi and Timothy Irwin, World Bank Working Paper No. 114, World Bank 2007.
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EU_PPP New_EU_Member_States_EN.pdf
As part of its ‘leading practices’ mandate, the GI Hub is developing a set of annotated risk allocation matrices for public-private partnership (PPP) transactions, in a variety of sectors. Risk allocation is at the centre of every PPP transaction, and a deep understanding of the risk allocation arrangements is a precondition to the drafting of every PPP agreement. The appropriate application of risk allocation principles is what determines whether a given PPP project will be ‘bankable’ (i.e. financeable), and whether it will be long-lasting (i.e.
This article explains the importance of the infrastructure sector for the economy of a country, and how SMEs can benefit from it, either by improving their businesses, or by leveraging their inherent local advantage (ie they would not face certain non-commercial risks as the direct foreign investors would.)
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El GI Hub ha contratado a Norton Rose Fulbright, una firma global de abogados, para preparar un informe sobre la Asignación de Riesgo en Contratos de Asociación Público-Privados (APP), versión 2016 (el Informe), con matrices que muestran la asignación de riesgo entre los sectores público y privado en transacciones APP típicas, conjuntamente con información relacionada sobre medidas de mitigación y arreglos característicos de soporte gubernamental. Se desarrollaron matrices separadas para 12 tipos designados de proyectos en los sectores de transporte, energía y agua y saneamiento.
作为“领先实践”工作的一部分，GIH与Norton Rose Fulbright（一家全球律师事务所）合作编制政府和社会资本合作（PPP）合同风险分配报告（2016版），报告所述矩阵展示了典型PPP交易中政府和社会资本之间的风险分配以及缓解措施，以及典型的政府支持安排，并且专门为运输、能源及供水与卫生行业的12个特定项目类型编制了独立矩阵。
“The Electric Social Compensation Fund (FOSE) promotes profitable RE private investment in off-grid power in rural towns, through subsidies, as part of a social inclusion policy.
The FOSE (legislated through Law No. 27510 of 2001) intends to promote electricity access to all residential customers whose consumption is lower than 100 kWh per month and to promote private investment in rural electrification systems under 20 MW.
全球基础建设中心（GI Hub），总部位于澳大利亚悉尼市，是由二十国集团成立、负责制订全球投资发展战略的组织机构。全球基础设施中心主要使命之一是将“先进经验”应用于高质量的基础设施投资活动中，包括项目鉴定、文件编制以及材料采购的指导文书的编制及出版发行。
根据这一主要使命，全球基础设施中心在诸多领域为政府和社会资本合作（PPP）交易确立了带有注释的风险分配矩阵。风险分配是每一PPP交易的要素，只有对其有了充分的理解才能制订好每一个PPP协议。风险分配原则将被用于确定某一PPP协议是否“具有银行可融资性”（融资能力）以及是否具有长效性（即在长期合同终止前保持其效力）。
全球基础设施中心委托国际化法律事务所，诺顿罗氏集团，编制一份有关2016年版《政府和社会资本合作（PPP）合同中风险分配》的报告。报告中的矩阵表征了典型PPP交易中国营部门及私营部门之间的风险分配。同时，报告中还给出了缓解措施以及典型的政府支持性协议。报告针对交通、能源、水利以及卫生部门的项目设计了12种不同矩阵。
Contingent government liabilities are associated with major hidden fiscal risks. Thus fiscal adjustment that targets deficit and debt reduction does not necessarily prevent fiscal instability. Banking problems, for example, have often unexpectedly drawn on public resources.
Fiscal risks and uncertainties are increasing for four main reasons. Private capital flows are increasing and becoming more volatile. States are moving from financing services to guaranteeing outcomes. Moral hazard in markets is on the rise. And policymakers are engaging in fiscal opportunism.